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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
         This case arises out of a debt of $800,885 that the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("Pennsylvania") owed 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
("HHS").  HHS notified Pennsylvania of the debt in June 1991.  
(App. 235a-239a)  Pennsylvania initially balked at having to pay, 
but eventually, in June 1993, paid the entire principal amount.  
(App. 16a)  The dispute that remains is over the interest on the 
debt.  HHS charged Pennsylvania interest at the private consumer 
rate of 15.125%, which was significantly higher than the rate 
usually charged by federal agencies to states, the current value 
of funds rate of 8%.  Pennsylvania refused to pay the allegedly 
exorbitant interest and brought this action, claiming primarily: 
(a) that HHS's use of the private consumer rate was not only 
arbitrary and capricious but inconsistent with the common law and 
(b) that HHS did not follow the proper procedures in enacting its 
interest rate regulation.  The district court found 
Pennsylvania's substantive claims to be without merit and its 
procedural challenges to be time-barred.  We affirm. 
                                I. 
         Until January 1987, HHS had a policy of not charging 
states interest on disallowances under the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program ("AFDC").  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 2)  On 
January 5, 1987, however, HHS repealed the existing regulation 
and put in place a new policy under which all of its debtors, 
including states and local governments, were to be charged a rate 
of interest based on the prevailing private consumer rates.  
(App. 202a & Dist. Ct. Op. at 2)  HHS's action was in response to 
congressional enactment of the Debt Collection Act of 1982 
("DCA"), which aimed at increasing the efficiency of government 
efforts to collect debts owed to the United States.  See S. Rep. 
No. 378, 97th Cong. 378, 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3377.  Although the DCA expressly excluded states 
and local governments from its ambit, see 31 U.S.C. § 3701 
(1983), it did not limit HHS's ability to assess interest under 
the common law, see United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 530 
(1993).  Accordingly, with certain exceptions not at issue here, 
HHS's regulations called for the imposition of interest on debts 
owed by states and local agencies in the same way as it was 
imposed on other debtors.  (App. 202a) See 52 Fed. Reg. 261 
(1987) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 30.13). 
         Under the HHS regulations at issue, interest on debts 
owed to HHS accrues from the date notice of the debt is mailed to 
the debtor, unless the debt is paid within 30 days of the notice.  
See 45 C.F.R. § 30.13(a).  The regulations provide that the rate 
to be charged shall be the "rate of interest as fixed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury after taking into consideration private 
consumer rates of interest."  Id.  The regulations do not 
provide for administrative review of the imposition of interest, 
but allow the Secretary to waive the interest if: (i) the debt or 
interest "resulted from the agency's error, action or inaction  . 
. . and [is] without fault on the part of the debtors" or (ii) 
collection "would defeat the overall objectives of a Departmental 
program."  45 C.F.R. § 30.13(h). 
         At issue is interest on a sum of $800,885 that was owed 
by Pennsylvania to HHS.  HHS gave Pennsylvania notice of the debt 
in June 1991.  (App. 235a-239a)  Pennsylvania, however, chose not 
to reimburse the federal government within 30 days, which would 
have enabled it to avoid any and all interest payments.  (App. 
10a)  By the time Pennsylvania paid the principal amount in July 
1993, $232,173.22 in interest charges had accumulated, and 
interest was continuing to accrue at 15.125% per annum.  (App. 
14a & Dist. Ct. Op. at 2). 
         Pennsylvania sought administrative review of the 
interest assessment, but HHS's Departmental Appeals Board 
informed it that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interest 
assessment.  (App. 18a-21a)  The Board noted, however, that the 
form of administrative review available to Pennsylvania was a 
request to the Secretary for a waiver of interest, but 
Pennsylvania had not sought such a waiver.  (App. 21a). 
         Pennsylvania commenced this action in October 1994, 
alleging that HHS's imposition of interest on it was arbitrary 
and violative of the common law.  (App. 9a-13a)  Pennsylvania 
also attacked the procedures by which HHS promulgated its 
interest rate regulations as inadequate.  (App. 9a-13a)  In 
February 1995, HHS responded with a motion for partial dismissal 
and summary judgment, arguing that Pennsylvania's substantive 
challenges were meritless and that its procedural challenges were 
time-barred.  The district court granted the motion, adopting as 
its own opinion the Report and Recommendation of Chief Magistrate 
Judge Mitchell.  Pennsylvania appeals. 
                               II. 
        A. Challenges to the Application of the Regulation 
         Pennsylvania makes three attacks on HHS's application 
of the interest rate regulation.  It argues: (i) that charging it 
interest without making an individualized determination as to the 
appropriateness of the charge was violative of the common law; 
(ii) that charging it the private consumer rate as opposed to the 
current value of funds rate was arbitrary and violative of 
government-wide policies; and (iii) that the use of a rate 
certified by the Treasury for a different federal program 
contravened HHS's own regulations on how the applicable interest 
rate should be determined. 
(i) Violation of the Common Law  
         Pennsylvania argues that HHS's interest rate regulation 
violates the common law because it fails to require a case-by- 
case determination of whether or not interest is appropriate and, 
if so, how much interest should be charged.  We find no support 
for this argument in the law that Pennsylvania cites. 
         The parties do not dispute that the federal government 
is permitted to charge states interest on their debts.  SeeUnited States 
v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 530 (1993) (United States 
has a federal common law right to collect prejudgment interest on 
debts owed to it by the states).  Instead, the dispute is over 
the process by which interest can be charged.  Pennsylvania 
points to the Supreme Court's decision in Texas as support for 
its argument.  Specifically, Pennsylvania points to language in 
Texas that says that "courts," in awarding prejudgment interest, 
are to "weigh competing federal and state interests."  Id. at 
536. 
         But Texas does not help Pennsylvania.  In that case, 
where there was an "individual case" in front of a district 
court, the Supreme Court said that the court considering the 
question "should weigh the federal and state interests involved."  
Id. at 533.  But the Court neither said, nor implied, anything 
about whether or not an agency could pre-specify the rate it was 
going to charge states that were delinquent on a particular class 
of debts. 
         Pennsylvania asserts that the general holding of Texaswas that 
Congress, in enacting the DCA, intended to hold states 
to a more lenient standard than private debtors.  However, the 
mere fact that Congress intended to exempt states from 
mandatorily having to pay at least the minimum rate specified by 
the DCA does not show that Congress either intended to exempt 
states from interest payments altogether, an argument rejected in 
Texas, see id. at 539, or that Congress intended to impose on 
federal agencies the costly task of an individualized 
consideration of the appropriateness of the rate to be applied in 
every case where a state is delinquent on its payments.  Cf. id.  
at 537-38 ("[I]t does not at all follow that because Congress did 
not tighten the screws on the States, it therefore intended that 
the screws be entirely removed"). 
         In sum, Pennsylvania has not given us a basis to read 
into the federal government's common law right to charge the 
states interest the costly and cumbersome obligation that a 
federal agency make an individualized determination as to the 
appropriate interest rate in every case where a state owes a 
debt.  To impose such additional costs on federal agencies would 
undermine their right to charge interest by significantly 
increasing the cost of charging such interest. 
         In addition, the regulation in question allows the 
state to ask for a waiver of the interest charged.  It states: 
         Waivers.  The Secretary may waive collecting 
         all or part of interest, administrative costs 
         or late payment penalties, if- 
 
         (1) The debt or the charges resulted from the 
         agency's error, action or inaction (other 
         than normal processing delays) and without 
         fault on the part of the debtors; or 
 
         (2) Collection in any manner authorized under 
         this regulation would defeat the overall 
         objectives of a Departmental program. 
45 C.F.R. § 30.13(h). 
         Even assuming that there is an obligation on the part 
of a federal agency to allow room for discretionary 
determinations as to how much interest to charge, the waiver 
provision would appear to satisfy such a requirement.  Under 
Section 30.13(h)(2), the Secretary has the ability to choose not 
to charge any or part of the interest due (especially if the 
state presents a compelling case).  45 C.F.R. § 30.13(h)(2).  
Pennsylvania, however, has explicitly stipulated that it does not 
meet the requirements for a waiver, (Pennsylvania Br. at 10) even 
though, to us, the class of cases that could fit into the waiver 
category appears very broad. 
(ii) Arbitrary and Inconsistent with Government-Wide Policies 
         Pennsylvania argues that government-wide policies 
require the use of the current value of funds rate, and that HHS 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in charging the private 
consumer rate.  We are not empowered to substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency unless its action was irrational, not 
based on relevant factors, or outside statutory authority.  SeeCitizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971).  We find none of those conditions present here. 
         The government-wide policy specific to interest rates 
is set out in the Federal Claims Collection Standards, which 
state in relevant part: 
         The rate of interest assessed shall be the 
         rate of the current value of funds to the 
         U.S. Treasury (i.e., the Treasury tax and 
         loan account rate), as prescribed and 
         published by the Secretary of the Treasury in 
         the Federal Register and the Treasury Fiscal 
         Requirements Manual Bulletins annually or 
         quarterly, in accordance with 31 U.S.C. [§] 
         3717.  An agency may assess a higher rate if 
         it reasonably determines that a higher rate 
         is necessary to protect the interests of the 
         United States.  
4 C.F.R. § 102.13 (emphasis added). 
         The language of the regulation unambiguously allows HHS 
to charge a rate higher than the current value of funds rate, so 
long as it is reasonably in the government's interest.  In this 
case, HHS charged the market rate of interest.  That is almost 
per se reasonable, but is doubly so where the agency in question 
is seeking to provide its debtors with incentives to clear their 
debts promptly. 
(iii)  Inconsistent with Internal Regulations  
         Pennsylvania's next argument is that HHS's charging it 
the private consumer rate was inconsistent with HHS's own 
regulations authorizing that the private rate be charged.  At 
issue is the language in the regulation that "the Secretary shall 
charge an annual rate of interest as fixed by Secretary of the 
Treasury after taking into consideration private consumer rates 
of interest prevailing on the date that the Department becomes 
entitled to recovery."  45 C.F.R. 30.13(a)(1).  Here, HHS did use 
a rate fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury.  But Pennsylvania 
argues that HHS was not permitted to use a rate determined in 
conjunction with a different federal program. 
         Pennsylvania's argument is unavailing.  We owe 
"substantial deference to an agency's construction of its own 
regulation."  Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center For Women v. 
Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
816 (1996) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991)).  We "must defer to 
the Secretary's interpretation unless an `alternative reading is 
compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other 
indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the 
regulation's promulgation.'"  Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386-87 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 
485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).  The plain language of the regulation 
here does not compel Pennsylvania's suggested reading.  Nor has 
Pennsylvania pointed to any indications of the Secretary's intent 
at the time of promulgation that support its reading.  Relying on 
an approximation of the private interest rate on the market that 
was determined for a different federal program was reasonable 
under the regulation.  We cannot say that HHS violated its own 
regulation. 
           B. Procedural Challenges to the Regulation  
Statute of Limitations 
         Pennsylvania asserts that HHS's interest rate 
regulation, adopted over eight years ago, is invalid because it 
was adopted pursuant to inadequate notice and comment procedures.  
The applicable statute of limitations for civil actions against 
the United States under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") 
is six years.  See, e.g., Dougherty v. United States Navy Bd., 
784 F.2d 499, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1986).  The regulation at issue was 
promulgated in final form in January 1987, and this suit was 
brought in October 1994.  Hence, Pennsylvania has to demonstrate 
that the statute of limitations was tolled for its claim to 
survive.  We agree with the district court that Pennsylvania 
failed this task. 
         The essence of Pennsylvania's argument that the statute 
of limitations has not run is that its claim was not "ripe" until 
less than six years before suit was filed.  Ripeness is largely a 
prudential doctrine designed "to prevent the courts, through 
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves 
in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also 
to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt 
in a concrete way by the challenging parties."  Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).  In 
conducting a ripeness analysis, the court must consider whether 
or not the question is purely legal and easy to resolve, whether 
the agency or court has an interest in postponing review, and the 
extent to which the parties will be caused hardship if review is 
withheld.  See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 
915 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, §§ 
2.4.2 & 2.4.3, 116-125 (1994); Cf. Artway v. Attorney General of 
N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1247 (3d Cir. 1996). 
         Pennsylvania provides us with little assistance in 
evaluating its ripeness challenge.  Its opening brief does not 
even mention the term "ripeness," let alone make a substantial 
argument as to why its claim was not ripe at the time of 
promulgation of the regulation.  Instead, Pennsylvania's opening 
brief merely states conclusorily that suit could not have been 
realistically brought at the time of promulgation of the 
regulation because there was no "substantial threat" of "real or 
immediate" harm at that time.  (Pennsylvania Br. at 23)  The 
first time that Pennsylvania mentioned the term "ripeness" was in 
its reply brief, but once again that brief contains nothing 
except a conclusory assertion that there was no substantial 
threat of real and immediate enforcement of the regulation at the 
time of its promulgation.  (Pennsylvania Reply Br. at 9)  These 
conclusory assertions are not enough.  We hold the ripeness 
argument waived.  See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir.) ("An issue is waived 
unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those 
purposes `a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice 
to bring that issue before this court.'" (citation omitted) 
(ellipsis in original)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 356 (1994); 
Service Employees Int'l Union v. Local 1199 N.E., 70 F.3d 647, 
653 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995) (argument mentioned in passing, but not 
squarely argued, is waived). 
         In any event, Pennylvania's ripeness challenge fails on 
its merits.  As a threshold matter, we note that the ripeness 
challenge here arises in an unusual setting.  Pennsylvania's 
argument isn't the typical argument that its claim is ripe today 
and should be adjudicated.  Rather, the argument is that 
Pennsylvania's claim was not ripe in 1987, when HHS's interest 
rate regulation was promulgated.  In effect, Pennsylvania wants 
us to conduct a hypothetical retrospective ripeness analysis.  As 
a general matter, courts are not well suited to decide 
hypothetical questions about what they might have done in the 
past.  See Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 914.  If courts were to 
"routinely conduct retrospective ripeness analyses where a late 
petitioner offers no compelling justification for not having 
filed his claim in a timely manner, [it]. . . would wreak havoc 
with the congressional intention that repose be brought to final 
agency action."  Id. 
         In this case, however, we can make the ripeness 
determination easily.  The Abbott Laboratories ripeness test 
involves consideration of: (I) the hardship to the parties of 
withholding consideration and (II) the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision.  387 U.S. at 149; Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. 
Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 1996).  We evaluate these 
factors in light of the circumstances that were in existence at 
the time of the promulgation of HHS's interest rate regulation. 
(I) Hardship to the Parties  
         The central question here is the extent to which 
denying the plaintiff judicial review would cause it hardship.  
See Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.4.2, 116-23.   We 
conclude that had Pennsylvania made its procedural challenges at 
the time of the promulgation of the regulation, a federal court 
would have determined that postponing review would cause 
Pennsylvania hardship. 
         At the outset, we note that Pennsylvania does not 
dispute that it had notice of HHS's regulations more than six 
years before October 1994, when the instant suit was commenced.  
HHS had proposed the repeal of its former regulation in the 
Federal Register in 1985 and had received public comment on its 
proposed rule changes that same year.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3 n.2)  
Further, in April 1988, HHS issued an Action Transmittal 
Memorandum to all state agencies administering programs under 
Title IV of the Social Security Act (which covers AFDC), alerting 
them that, in accordance with its regulations, HHS was going to 
charge interest on disallowed paid claims for which states had 
received federal financial participation.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3 
n.2). 
         Pennsylvania argues that its claim was not ripe at the 
time of promulgation of the regulation because it had no 
outstanding debts at the time and hence was not immediately 
subject to an interest charge.  In essence, the claim is that 
there was no hardship at the time of the promulgation of the 
regulation.  That is like saying that an increase in the interest 
rate charged for late payments on a credit card presents no 
hardship to the customer because the customer has not yet made a 
delayed payment under the new and higher interest rate.  We 
disagree with that premise.  Instead, we think it more likely 
that the customer will have to change his behavior at the time he 
is informed of the rate hike in order to avoid the risk of having 
to pay the higher interest rate and hence will suffer a direct 
hardship at the time of the rate hike.  The fact that the new, 
higher interest rate is a contingent future charge does not 
preclude it from causing harm to the party at the time it is put 
into place.  Cf. Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1012 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (fact that harm from adoption of a plan negatively 
affected payments that plaintiff was to receive many years into 
the future did not preclude adjudication of claim at the current 
time; the plan concretely harmed plaintiff in creating 
uncertainty regarding his future income stream); cf. also Lorance 
v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906-08 (1989) (in 
suit challenging a seniority system that allegedly discriminated 
against women, Court ruled that plaintiffs could sue at the time 
the system was put into place without waiting for the system's 
adverse effects because the very adoption of the plan imposed a 
concrete harm on the plaintiffs). 
         Had Pennsylvania challenged the regulation at the time 
of its promulgation, that would have eliminated the uncertainty 
as to its obligations thereunder.  The elimination of this 
uncertainty as to whether or not it could be charged a rate of 
interest as high as the rate applicable on the private consumer 
market would have made it easier for Pennsylvania to decide how 
long it wanted to delay on payments it owed HHS.  Concurrently, 
HHS would also have benefitted from the resolution of uncertainty 
regarding the validity of its regulation. 
         (II) Fitness of the Issues for Resolution 
         Once again we look retrospectively to the time of 
promulgation of the regulation.  The question is whether the 
issues were fit to be resolved at the time and whether the agency 
or court would have had an interest in postponing review.  SeeEagle-
Picher, 759 F.2d at 915; see also Artway, 81 F.3d at 1249 
("The more that the question presented is purely one of law, and 
the less that additional facts will aid the court in its inquiry, 
the more likely the issue is to be ripe, and vice-versa.")  
Pennsylvania's challenge would have been to whether HHS followed 
the proper notice and comment procedures in the enactment of its 
regulation.  All the facts pertaining to such a challenge would 
have been fully developed and available at the time of the 
promulgation of the regulation.  Delay would not have allowed the 
development of additional facts, and would only have served to 
make the relevant facts harder to retrieve. 
         In sum, the "injury" to Pennsylvania occurred at the 
time of the alleged procedural improprieties, and Pennsylvania 
was "aggrieved" at the time of promulgation of the regulation.  
See JEM Broadcasting v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 
(9th Cir. 1990).  Hence, Pennsylvania's procedural challenge 
should have been brought within six years of the promulgation of 
the regulation. 
         C. Exclusion of Documents and Incomplete Rulemaking     
         Record     
         In addition to challenging HHS's notice and comment 
procedures, Pennsylvania argues that the district court erred in 
excluding certain documents from the record on the ground of 
privilege and in granting summary judgment on an incomplete 
rulemaking record.  From what we can discern, the documents 
Pennsylvania seeks pertain to the rulemaking process and not the 
application of the rule.  Pennsylvania has failed to apprise us 
of how these documents or a more complete rulemaking record would 
change or influence our conclusions as to HHS's application of 
the regulation.  Therefore, we see no basis for reversing the 
decision of the district court.     
                               III. 
         The decision of the district court is affirmed.  Costs 
are awarded to the appellee, the United States. 
 
